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I. INTRODUCTION

During the oral argument in Marylandv. King, the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision allowing the police to secure DNA samples from arrestees
without a search warrant, Justice Alito was being only slightly hyperbolic
when he referred to King as "perhaps the most important criminal procedure
case that this Court has heard in decades."' When decided several months
later, the five-member majority opinion issued by the Court did not
disappoint, stating in categorical terms that "[w]hen officers make an arrest
supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense[,] .. . taking and
analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and
photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." 2 DNA, Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority, was simply a more accurate method of identifying individuals and
accessing their criminal history,3 needed to make informed decisions on bail

* Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to
Professor Arnold Loewy and members of the Texas Tech Law Review for organizing and inviting me to
participate in the 2015 Criminal Law Symposium: The Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century, and to
Christina Colbert (J.D. 2016) for her research assistance.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207),
2013 WL 1842092. On the increasingly central role of DNA in law enforcement more generally, see JOHfN
M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS (2d ed.

2005) and DNA Evidence Basics, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/
evidence/dna/basics/Pages/welcome.aspx.
2. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980; see also id. at 1968 ("Although [DNA collection] statutes vary in their
particulars, such as what charges require a DNA sample, their similarity means that this case implicates
more than the specific Maryland law. At issue is a standard, expanding technology already in widespread
use throughout the Nation.").
3. See id. at 1972 ("[The only difference between DNA analysis and the accepted use of fingerprint
databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.. .. DNA is another metric of identification used to
connect the arrestee with his or her public persona, as reflected in records of his or her actions that are
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and other pretrial matters.' While the buccal swab of King's cheek to secure
DNA was admittedly a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, it was a
reasonable one given its "minimal" intrusiveness and the "significant
government interest at stake in the identification of arrestees."s
The majority's opinion prompted a spirited dissent from Justice Scalia,
who was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor. 6 In Justice
Scalia's estimate, the majority's effort to characterize the collection and
analysis of DNA as simply a personal identification method "taxe[d] the
credulity of the credulous."' In support, he noted that Maryland authorities
knew King's identity at the time of his arrest and that the real utility of the
DNA sample taken from him came almost four months later when laboratory
results tied him to a prior unsolved sexual assault.' Further indicative of the
state's forensic investigative (as opposed to identity verification) purpose lay
in the fact that King's sample was submitted to a database containing DNA
collected from crime scenes and that Maryland's enabling law itself
emphasized the investigative value of collecting and analyzing DNA.'
Justice Scalia concluded by noting that the majority failed to articulate any
limiting principle that would not also allow DNA to be extracted from
persons arrested for non-serious offenses,'o permitting the eventual creation
of a "genetic panopticon.""
Although King has already prompted a substantial body of critical
commentary,1 2 to date, an important outgrowth of the decision has eluded
available to the police.... [DNA] uses a different form of identification than a name or fingerprint, but
its function is the same.").
4. Id at 1980.
5. Id at 1977-79.
6. Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Id
8. Id. at 1984.
9. Id. at 1982-86. Putting a finer point on the issue, Justice Scalia observed:
If identifying someone means finding out what unsolved crimes he has committed, then
identification is indistinguishable from the ordinary law-enforcement aims that have never
been thought to justify a suspicionless search. Searching every lawfully stopped car, for
example, might turn up information about unsolved crimes the driver had committed, but
no one would say that such a search was aimed at "identifying" him, and no court would
hold such a search lawful.
Id. at 1983.
10. Id. at 1989. Indeed, such expansion seemed what Justice Kennedy had in mind when he noted
that "[it is a common occurrence that '[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most
devious and dangerous criminals,"' citing examples such as the traffic stop of Timothy McVeigh after the
Oklahoma City bombing. Id at 1971 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Florence v. Bd.
of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012)); see also Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269, 1273
(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Court's reasoning in King is not dependent on
the seriousness of the crimes involved.").
11. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Maryland v. King: Policing and Genetic Privacy, 11 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 281, 282 (2013); David H. Kaye, Why So Contrived? FourthAmendment Balancing, Per Se
Rules, andDNA DatabasesAfter Maryland v. King, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535 (2014); Tracey
Maclin, Maryland v King: Terry v Ohio Redux, 2013 SUP. CT. REv. 359, 362 (2014); Erin Murphy,

2015]

USE OF UNLAWFULLY SECURED DNA EVIDENCE

271

attention: whether the government can retain and use DNA secured from an
unlawfully arrested individual. In King, the defendant's lawful arrest for
assault justified the taking of his DNA sample.13 What if, however, an
individual is unlawfully arrested yet a sample is taken pursuant to a "routine
booking procedure" such as in King?14
In his dissent, Justice Scalia surmised that "[a]s an entirely predictable
consequence of [the majority's] decision, your DNA can be taken and entered
into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and
for whatever reason."" As it turns out, under current exclusionary rule
doctrine, there is considerable truth to Justice Scalia's assessment.' 6 In a line
of cases stretching back several decades, courts have permitted police to
retain and use for investigative purposes photos and fingerprints secured
through unlawful arrests." Suppression is required only if the arrestee proves
that the sole or primary purpose of the illegal arrest was to secure the prints,
photos, or both-a finding usually undercut when the evidence is acquired
pursuant to a routine booking procedure.
Against this backdrop, the King majority's willingness to uncritically
couple DNA sampling with fingerprints and photos assumes added
importance. Should the coupling oblige an equally uncritical application of
exclusionary rule doctrine vis-A-vis unlawfully secured DNA? 19 This Article
answers this question in the negative and makes the case for legislative action
to limit the government's ability to retain and use unlawfully secured DNA.2 0
II. CASELAW

The doctrinal starting point is Davis v. Mississippi,' a case with facts
that have long served as a benchmark for the kind of impermissible police
behavior sufficient to warrant exclusion of identification evidence. In Davis,
the police, acting on information from a sexual assault victim that her
assailant was a "Negro youth," rounded up at least two dozen black youths,

License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARv. L. REV. 161, 161
(2013); Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in Law
Enforcement, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 295, 296 (2013).
13. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 552 n.2 (Md. 2012), rev d, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). This was so even
though King was arrested and charged with first-degree assault, an offense expressly subject to DNA
collection under Maryland law, yet the charge was subsequently dismissed and King pled guilty to
misdemeanor second-degree assault, a non-enumerated offense. Id.
14. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965.
15. Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. See infra PartII.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
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who were fingerprinted, briefly questioned, and released.22 Several days
later, one of the young men, petitioner Davis, was arrested without probable
cause and again fingerprinted, which resulted in a match of prints found at
the sexual assault scene.23 With the State of Mississippi conceding that no
probable cause existed to justify Davis's detention on either occasion, the
Court suppressed the fingerprint evidence because the police had the "sole
purpose of obtaining fingerprints."24
Almost fifteen years later, in Hayes v. Florida,25 the Court again
addressed whether an unlawful arrest executed by police to secure
fingerprints should trigger the exclusionary rule. In Hayes, an individual was
arrested without probable cause and taken to the police station to secure
fingerprints, which linked him to an unsolved burglary. 26 Applying Davis,
the Court unanimously concluded that the fingerprints be suppressed because
the defendant was unlawfully arrested for "investigative purposes."27
In Davis and Hayes, the evidence secured was used in connection with
the offense for which the individual was unlawfully arrested. Courts,
however, over time have also been asked to address whether fingerprints or
photos secured as the result of an unlawful arrest can be used to tie an arrestee
to an unrelated crime, which occurred before or after the evidence was
secured, perhaps by another police department.28 In 1972, in People v.
McInnis,29 the California Supreme Court issued the seminal decision on the
question.
In McInnis, Los Angeles police officers unlawfully arrested an
individual for possessing a pistol and photographed the arrestee at booking.30
One month later, police in nearby Pasadena showed the photo to a robbery
victim who identified McInnis as the perpetrator.3
The McInnis court allowed use of the photo because "the illegal arrest
was in no way related to the crime with which defendant was ultimately
charged"; it was "pure happenstance" that the photo secured by Los Angeles
police was later used- by Pasadena police to solve an unrelated crime.3 2
Securing a photo during booking was "standard police procedure, bearing no
22. Id. at 722.
23. Id. at 723.
24. Id. at 727.
25. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
26. Id. at 812-13.
27. Id. at 815.
28.

See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 9.4(d),

at 517 (3d ed. 2000) ("Davis

must be distinguished from a case where the prints were taken as a matter of routine following an arrest
which was illegal but not made for the express purpose of having the prints on file for later use, and then
were used on a later occasion to connect the defendant with some crime totally unrelated to the reasons
underlying the illegal arrest.").
29. 494 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1972) (en banc).
30. Id. at 691.
3 1. Id.
32. Id at 692.
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relationship to the purpose or validity of the arrest or detention."33
Furthermore, "To hold that all such pictures resulting from illegal arrests are
inadmissible forever ... would allow the criminal immunity because another
constable in another jurisdiction in another case had blundered. It would in:
effect be giving a crime insurance policy in perpetuity to all persons once
illegally arrested .

...

State and federal lower courts reviewing claims in both contexts have
been notably reluctant to suppress photos and fingerprints. Fortunately,
round-ups of individuals like those condemned in Davis are rare." Faced
with less outlandish facts, courts refuse to suppress photos or fingerprints
simply because an arrest was unlawful, 3 even when there is "clearly less than
probable cause to arrest."3 ' They do so by readily finding bases to conclude
that an arrest is not "solely" or "primarily" motivated to secure evidence,38
deeming it significant that prints or photos were secured pursuant to a
"routine" booking or administrative procedures.
At the same time, in the McInnis context, as Professor LaFave has
observed, courts have not been "vigilant" in policing the police when it
comes to populating "mug books." 40 To date, it appears that there has only
been a single instance in which a court suppressed identity evidence secured

33. Id (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 693; see also United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1978) ("(T]o grant
life-long immunity from investigation and prosecution simply because a violation of the Fourth
Amendment first indicated to the police that a man was not the law-abiding citizen he purported to be
would stretch the exclusionary rule beyond tolerable bounds." (quoting United States v. Friedland, 441
F.2d 855, 861 (2d Cir. 1971)).
35. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722 (1969).
36. See, e.g., State v. Price, 558 P.2d 701, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Thierry, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Paulson v. State, 257 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Miller v.
State, 824 A.2d 1017, 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003);. Gibson v. State, 771 A.2d 536 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2001); State v. Tyrrell, 453 N.W.2d 104, 110 (Neb. 1990).
37. People v. Shaver, 396 N.E.2d 643,647 (111. App. Ct. 1979). Several years earlier, the same court
held that a photo secured as the result of an illegal arrest must be suppressed only if the arrest was "based
on such a lack of probable cause as to force the conclusion that it was made solely to acquire data regarding
the defendant. . .. [TJhe illegal arrest [must be] prompted by a desire for records only." People v. Pettis,
298 N.E.2d 372, 376 (111. Ct. App. 1973).
38. See, e.g., Thierry, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146 ("Only when law enforcement officers make illegal
arrests for the primary purpose of obtaining photographs ... is there a constitutional justification to bar
use of those photographs in identifying the perpetrators of crimes."); People v. Price, 394 N.E.2d 1256,
1264 (111. App. Ct. 1979) ("It is a well established rule that if the unlawful arrest was purely for
investigative purposes, solely to acquire general data regarding defendant, the evidence should be
suppressed."); State v. Hacker, 627 P.2d 11, 17 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) ("If an unlawful arrest was purely for
investigative purposes, solely to acquire identification evidence regarding defendant, the evidence should
be suppressed.").
39. See, e.g., United States v. Beckwith, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1293-94 (D. Utah 1998); S.E.G. v.
State, 645 So. 2d 347, 349 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); People v. McInnis, 494 P.2d 690, 692 (Cal. 1972) (en
banc); Robinson v. State, 452 A.2d 1291, 1299 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Hacker, 627 P.2d at 17.
40.

§

6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

11.4(g), at 463 (5th ed. 2012).
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for future investigative purposes.41 Applying attenuation doctrine,42 courts
as a rule deem intervening circumstances and passage of time as bases to
justify government retention and investigative use of unlawfully secured
photos and fingerprints.4 3
In Maryland v. King, the Court treated fingerprints, photographs, and
DNA profiles as fungible forms of identity evidence." The question taken
up next is whether DNA secured as the result of an illegal arrest, collected
pursuant to a "routine booking procedure," should be subject to the same
permissive exclusionary rule regime as just surveyed vis-A-vis photos and
fingerprints. For reasons discussed, strong reason exists to conclude that this
should be the case.
III. A BRIDGE Too FAR: HOW AND WHY DNA DIFFERS FROM PHOTOS
AND FINGERPRINTS

A DNA sample differs in several important respects from a fingerprint
or photograph. Jurisprudentially, as Justice Scalia noted in his King dissent,
neither a photograph nor the act of being subject to a photograph implicates
the Fourth Amendment. 45 And while the taking of a fingerprint entails a
physical intrusion (or at least imposition) by the police, fingerprinting has
never been formally deemed a search under the Fourth Amendment.46
Fingerprints, the Court has observed in dictum, are "mere 'physical
characteristics . . . constantly exposed to the public,"' 47 and both Davis v.
41. See People v. Rodriguez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (barring photo secured
on basis of illegal seizure intended to secure photographs for inclusion in a "gang book" for use in "future
criminal investigations"). In a case decided four years before King, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Las
Vegas police, acting without judicial authorization or statutory authority, violated the civil rights of a
pretrial detainee from whom they forcibly and under threat of violence extracted a DNA sample to help
solve an unrelated "cold case." Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2009). The petitioner
was not an active suspect in any cold case and the record indicated that the DNA secured never tied
petitioner to any cold case. Id. at 851-52.
42. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (specifying three factors that are to be
considered in assessing whether evidence seized is attenuated from the taint of an unlawful seizure: (1) the
time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening
circumstances; and (3) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct").
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Manning, 693 N.E.2d 704,708 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998); Hacker, 627
P.2d at 17; Kinsey v. State, 639 S.W.2d 486,489 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no pet.).
44. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971-72 (2013).
45. Id. at 1986 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also People v. Thierry, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 145 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (noting that "indeed there is no need to arrest a suspect in order to arrest a suspect in order to
take a photograph of him or her. Officers can surreptitiously photograph people on the street without
arresting or detaining them in any way.").
46. See Wayne A. Logan, PolicingIdentity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1603-04 (2012).
47. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14
(1973)); see also Stehney v. Perry, 907 F. Supp. 806, 823 (D. N.J. 1995) (holding that "the taking of a
fingerprint is not a search, even though it involves touching and pressing, and reveals physiological traits
too minute to be considered exposed to public view in any meaningful sense" (citation omitted)); Palmer
v. State, 679 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ind. 1997) (noting that "fingerprints are an identifying factor readily
available to the world at large").
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Mississippi and Hayes v. Florida can be fairly read as condemning the
unlawful arrests executed by the police to secure fingerprints, not the
fingerprinting itself.4 8 By contrast, extraction and analysis of DNA, as King
itself makes clear, is indeed a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 49
Functionally, DNA differs in critically important ways from photos and
fingerprints. Not only does DNA provide a far more accurate way to verify
the identity of arrested individuals, as the King majority observed,so it affords
vastly greater power as a forensic investigative tool." Almost forty years
ago, in People v. McInnis, California Supreme Justice Tobriner worried that
the police would "stand to profit from illegal arrests" if they could retain and
use photos taken of arrestees: "If [the police] may use the direct fruits of
illegal arrests in the prosecution of the individual for another offense, they
will have a decided incentive to arrest anyone whom they 'suspect' may be
involved in illegal activity, regardless of whether that suspicion is legally
sufficient for an arrest."S2 As a consequence, "[m]ore innocent citizens will
now face illegal arrest, and with it, the resulting disabilities of a [criminal]
record.""
If such concern was justified vis-i-vis the comparatively modest
investigative benefits of photos, the massively superior forensic capability of
DNA, now well known to the police," should warrant proportionately greater
concern among courts and policymakers." In a nation where roughly one
48. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (alteration in original) (stating that its decision
to exclude fingerprints taken as a result of an unlawful arrest and transport to the police station did not
"impl[y] that a brief detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable
suspicion not amounting to probable cause, is necessarily impermissible under the Fourth Amendment");
Dionisio,410 U.S. at 11 (stating that in Davis "it was the initial seizure-the lawless dragnet detentionthat violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, not the taking of the fingerprints," and that Davis
left open the possibility that fingerprints could be secured in the absence of probable cause to arrest (citing
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969))); Davis, 394 U.S. at 727-28 ("Fingerprinting involves
none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.").
49. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968-69 (majority opinion); see also State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661, 678
(Vt. 2014) ("We do not equate a procedure that takes a visible image of the surface of the skin of a finger
with the capture of intimate bodily fluids, even if the method of doing so is speedy and painless."); cf
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (noting the "importance of requiring authorization by
a 'neutral and detached magistrate' before allowing a law enforcement officer to 'invade another's body
in search of evidence of guilt,"' absent existence of a recognized exception to the warrant requirement
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948))).
50. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1976.
51.

See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second

Generation ofScientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REv. 721, 728 (2007).
52. People v. McInnis, 494 P.2d 690, 695 (Cal. 1972) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
53. Id
54. For results ofa field survey highlighting police interest in populating DNA databases, see Jason
Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentationof Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REv. 1491, 1512-13 (2015).
55. United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2011) (expressing concern over creation of
"perverse incentives[,] . . . a system of post-hoc rationalization through which the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against illegal searches and seizures can be nullified"). Whether an officer's administrative
motive can trump legislative intent evincing an express investigative (versus identification) purpose, as in
Louisiana's law directing police to collect DNA samples from arrestees, presents an intriguing question.
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third of adults can expect to be arrested by the age of twenty-three,' 6 and a
massive number of arrests do not result in prosecution," much less
conviction,s" such an incentive structure is surely a less than positive
development. 9
Finally, DNA differs qualitatively from a photo or fingerprints because
it contains a trove of genetic information."o While state and federal laws now
permit governments to upload and analyze only extractions of DNA samples,
"profiles" consisting of "junk DNA,"' the King majority was equivocal on
whether sensitive, personal, or medical information is also stored for possible
use.62 While such information raises obvious privacy concerns in principle,
the possibility exists that governments can put the information to "predictive"
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (2012) ("The Louisiana Legislature finds and declares that DNA data banks
are important tools in criminal investigations . . . .").
56. Robert Brame et al., Cumulative PrevalenceofArrestfrom Ages 8 to 23 in a NationalSample,
129 PEDIATRICS 21, 26 (2011).

57. See, e.g., Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecutionandthe FourthAmendment, 59 MD. L. REV.
1, 40-41 (2000); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1313, 1331-37 (2012).
58. See, e.g., Andrew Golub et al., The Race/EthnicityDisparityin MisdemeanorMaryuanaArrests
in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 131,147 (2007) (reporting a non-conviction rate of 80%
for marijuana in public view (MPV) arrests in New York City from 1992-2003); Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
ManagerialJusticeand Mass Misdemeanors,66 STAN. L. REv. 611, 674 (2014) (noting that in New York
City less than half of misdemeanor arrests in 2012 resulted in a conviction of any kind). In 2013, in
Califomia, almost one-third of the over 305,000 adult felony arrests did not result in a conviction. See
KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP'T OF JUST., CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 49, http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/

agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/candd/cdl3/cdl3.pdf7 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). New York reports a
similar rate. See Data Source Notes, NYS DivisION CRIM. JUST. SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.
ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/all.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2015); see also Anthony M. DeStefano, Many
NYPD Gun Arrests Dismissed or Not Prosecuted, NEWSDAY (Apr. 27, 2015, 9:45 PM), http://www.
(noting
newsday.com/news/new-york/many-nypd-gun-arrests-dismissed-or-not-prosecuted-1.10339300
that 53% of unlawful firearm possession arrests in the Bronx and 40% of arrests in Brooklyn were
dismissed or not prosecuted in 2014). It should be noted that conviction data is of questionable value
given that innocent individuals, especially those swept up in high-volume urban justice systems, might
well plead guilty to a low-level offense simply to alleviate the cost (for example, remaining in jail and
missing work or paying for counsel) of challenging what might be a wrongful arrest. See Steven Zeidman,
Policingthe Police: The Role ofthe Courts and the Prosecution,32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 318 (2005).
59. On the multiple negative consequences of arrests for individuals, including physical trauma,
invasion of privacy, near- and long-term adverse employment effects, and loss of access to housing and
loans, see Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REv. 809, 820-25 (2015). See also Gary Fields
& John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find ConsequencesCan Last a Lifetime, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-findconsequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402.
60.

JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 262 (2010); see also King v.

State, 42 A.3d 549, 577 (Md. 2012) ("We cannot tum a blind eye to the vast genetic treasure map that
remains in the DNA sample retained by the State."), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
61. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387,420 (3d Cir. 2011). Whether in fact a DNA profile
contains only "junk," devoid of personal or medical information significance, has been the subject of
considerable debate. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Is the "Junk"DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 Nw. U.L. REv.
COLLOQUY 54, 56-60 (2007), http//www.northwestemlawreview.org/online/"junk"-dna-designationbunk; Alice Park, Junk DNA-Not So Useless After All, TIME (Sept. 6, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/
2012/09/06/junk-dna-not-so-useless-after-all/.
62. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013) (noting that "[t]he argument that the testing
at issue in this case reveals any private medical information at all is open to dispute").
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use vis-A-vis behavioral tendencies, like addiction, aggression, or criminal
propensity.63 DNA, moreover, permits "familial searching," which allows
innocent family members to come within the investigative crosshairs of
police.' This is because, unlike fingerprints and photographs, "[g]enetic
information is shared, and it is shared immutably and nonvolitionally" by
family members who can be subjected to police inquiry and possible
investigation.6 5
Ultimately, if governments are permitted to collect DNA samples,
unmoored from even the bare minimum legal requirement of probable cause
sufficient to justify an arrest, we can anticipate even broader negative
impact. 6 Community members, aware of the government's capacity to
secure, retain, and make use of DNA, even when acting unlawfully,67 might
be less inclined to engage in public life.68 In United States v. Jones, Justice
Sotomayor expressed concern that widespread locational monitoring by the
government risked "chill[ing] associational and expressive freedoms.'
Genetic databasing should engender at least as much worry.

9

&

63. See, e.g., Tania Simoncelli & Sheldon Krimsky, A New Era ofDNA Collections: At What Cost
to Civil Liberties?, AM. CONST. Soc'Y 1, 12-13 (Sept. 2007), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/
SimoncelliKrimsky_-_DNACollectionCivilLiberties.pdf
64. See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MIcH. L. REV.
291, 297 (2010) (describing familial searching as the practice "of looking in a DNA database not for the
person who left the crime-scene sample, but rather for a relative of that individual"); id. at 338-39 (noting
that familial searching creates a list of suspects "compiled on no other basis than that they, rather than the
rest of the population with the same characteristics, happen to have kin in the offender database").
65. See Natalie Ram, Fortuity and ForensicFamilialIdentification,63 STAN. L. REv. 751, 789-94
(2011).
66. As Professors David Kaye and Michael Smith have observed, "probable cause to arrest is spread
thick and wide through the populace, attaching to the innocent-in-fact as well as to those guilty of the
crime for which probable cause exists. Probable cause is thus an extremely low threshold, and a poor
shield against the government taking and profiling our DNA-and against abuse of that power." D.H.
Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identiication Databases: Legality Legitimacy, and the Case for
Population-WideCoverage, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 413, 458 n.153.
67. That DNA collection would perversely target innocents was not lost on Justice Scalia. After
noting that all parties agreed that Maryland would have been justified in securing a DNA sample from
King if he were convicted of an enumerated offense, he wrote:
So the ironic result of the Court's error is this: The only arrestees to whom the outcome here
will ever make a difference are those who have been acquitted of the crime of arrest (so that
their DNA could not have been taken upon conviction). In other words, this Act manages to
burden uniquely the sole group for whom the Fourth Amendment's protections ought to be
most jealously guarded: people who are innocent of the State's accusations.
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by Police, 52 J. CRM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 255, 264 (1961) (stating that "[a]ll the other freedoms, freedom of speech, of assembly, of
religion, of political action" turn on the preexistence of security and privacy).
69. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); cf Raynor v.
State, 99 A.3d 753, 774 (Md. 2014) (Adkins, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority's
approval of unfettered retention and analysis of abandoned DNA samples "means, in essence, that a person
desiring to keep her DNA profile private, must conduct her public affairs in a hermetically-sealed hazmat
suit"), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015).
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The prospect becomes especially troubling given the acknowledged
racial and demographic skewing of arrests, which becomes inscribed in
DNA databases.7 ' Already often socially and politically marginalized,72 poor
and minority community members will feel even further alienated from
government, impeding the trust that research has shown to play a critical role
in law abidingness and cooperation with police.
In short, even accepting the doctrinal status quo regarding unlawfully
secured photos and fingerprints, ample reason exists for courts to take a
different approach with DNA. Whether they will do so, however, remains
doubtful. A majority of the Supreme Court in King felt no compunction in
conjoining DNA with photos and fingerprints, 4 and was comforted by the
fact that DNA is extracted in the course of a routine administrative procedure,
as lower courts have with unlawful collection of photos and fingerprints."
Finally, the Supreme Court's obvious disdain for the exclusionary rule
underscores the need to look beyond the courts for a solution."
IV. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Today, only modest limits exist on the power of governments to collect,
retain, and put to investigative use unlawfully secured DNA evidence. Of
the thirty-two states allowing for pre-conviction DNA collection, only eight
require that before a DNA sample is collected, a court must first conclude
that an arrest for an eligible offense was supported by probable cause.7 7
70. See Logan, supranote 46, at 1590.
71. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, FingerprintIdentificationand the CriminalJustice System: Historical
Lessonsfor the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 63, 80 (David Lazer ed., 2004);
Troy Duster, Selective Arrests, an Ever-Expanding DNA ForensicDatabase, and the Specter ofan Early-

&

Twenty-FirstCentury EquivalentofPhrenology, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 315, 31922, 329 (David Lazer ed., 2004); SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA
DATABANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 252-74 (2011); Kerry Abrams

&

Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2473728 (manuscript at 34).
72. See, e.g., David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1173 (2014) ("Poor
urban minority communities, which experience a disproportionate share of police ... practices, often have
little political influence and lack the means to press legislators to openly debate issues.").
73. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 101-02 (2002); Tom R. Tyler
Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their
Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 240 (2008).
74. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 4-5, 35-39 and accompanying text; see also David H. Kaye, supra note 12, at
591 ("[Trawling] after charges are dropped or after a defendant is acquitted violates almost no legitimate
Fourth Amendment interests. When police show a mugshot of an arrested, but not convicted, defendant
to a victim of an assault, they do not engage in a new search or seizure.").
76. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011); Herring v. United States, 555
U.S. 135, 135 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 586 (2006).
77. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4-3 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.105 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 1 st Special Legis. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4126(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Legis. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Legis. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, §§ 1932-33, 1940 (West, Westlaw through 2d Sess. of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN.
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Seven other states permit collection, but a sample can be analyzed or
uploaded to a DNA database only after a court concludes that probable cause
supported the arrest." In the remaining seventeen states (more than half),
probable cause is not a precondition to the collection or uploading and
analysis of a DNA sample." Rather, a back-end approach is taken:
expungement is to occur when an arrestee is not charged, the charge is
dismissed or reduced to a non-qualifying offense, or the conviction is
reversed."o
Overall, the statutory landscape represents an improvement over the
doctrinal landscape discussed earlier regarding unlawfully secured photos
and fingerprints." With DNA, however, the gatekeeping is very often less
than it appears. The difficulty lies in statutory shortcomings in when and
how DNA profiles and the genetic samples on which they are based are
expunged. In states where collection as a threshold matter hinges on a
probable cause determination, exclusion is not at issue: a sample is never
even collected. In the event a DNA sample is collected, however, mechanics
become important.82
In only eleven states-well under half the total number-DNA profiles
and samples are automatically expunged by the government when it is
§ 19.2-310.2:1

(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.); see also Convicted Offenders Required

to Submit DNA Samples, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/cj/Convicted

OffendersDNALaws.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). In Texas, a sample can be collected only after
indictment, except when the suspect has prior convictions. TEx. Gov'T. CODE ANN.

§

411.1471 (West

2012).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-23-103(1), -104(2) (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY
§§ 2-504, -511 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.09123 (Westlaw
through 2015 Legis. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-3-10, -16-10 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Legis.
Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.5-8(a) (West, Westlaw through Jan. of 2015 Legis. Sess.); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 53-10-403, -404.5, -406 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Special Legis. Sess.); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 165.76, .84 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 60).
79. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25(c)(1) (2015); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.41.035 (2012); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-610 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-1006, -1019, -1105 (2009); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 296, 296.1, 299 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 54-102(g)-(i) (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:609:614 (2012); MIcH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 750.520m (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Veto Sess.); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-47-1(2)(b)
(2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 650.055 (West, Westlaw through Act 142 of 2015 Legis.); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53:1-20.20, -20.25 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 115 of 2015 Legis. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-13-03, -13-07 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 484 of 2015 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.07 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-620 (Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess., Acts 1 & 3); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23-5A-1, 5A-52, -5A-16, -5A-28 (Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
80. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-18-25(c)(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325; LA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:609:614; MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-47-l(2)(b).
81.

See supra Parts 11-111.

82.

States, to be eligible to upload their arrestee DNA profiles to the federal National DNA Index,

must have an expungement mechanism of some kind, which must be approved by the FBI. See Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet

(last visited Oct. 31, 2015) ("Laboratories ... are required to expunge qualifying profiles from the National
Index under the following circumstances: .. . . For arrestees, if the participating laboratory receives a
certified copy of a final court order documenting the charge has been dismissed, resulted in an acquittal

or no charges have been brought within the applicable time period.").
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determined that expungement is in order.1 3 In the remaining twenty-one
states, the onus is on individuals to seek expungement, an often complex,
lengthy process entailing costs,84 which combine to result in very low
incidence of expungement. 5 In addition, only rarely do state laws require
that an arrestee be notified of the right to seek expungement and the
circumstances under which it can occur.86 Consequently, as a practical
matter, DNA profiles and samples remain in government hands. 87
Even when a petition is successfully filed, or the government assumes
responsibility for expungement, law and procedure is wanting.8 8 Most states
do not impose a time by which expungement must occur, adding to the
already lengthy time period required for a case to be fully litigated (for
example, a reversal of a conviction on appeal).89 Even more problematic,
often the very purpose of expungement is undercut by laws expressly
allowing a profile "hit" to be used in an investigation when the state fails to
expunge or delays expungement.90 California law, for instance, provides that
83. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1021(b); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-4-3(f-1) (West
2007); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511 (a)(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.176(10); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-4126(6) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l5A266.3A(h) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.5-8(a)-(b); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-3-660; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Legis. Sess.);

20 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1940 (West, Westlaw through 2d Sess. Of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.).
84. In Arkansas, for instance, only a reversal of conviction warrants expungement, and a petitioner
must go to the trouble and expense of securing a court order. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1019. In
California, an individual must petition for expungement, which a court has the discretion to deny. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 299(b).
85. See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, The Myth ofArrestee DNA Expungement, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 51 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstractid=2641079.
86. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-23-103(2)(a) (West 2012); MD. CODE. ANN., PUB.
SAFETY § 2-504 (a)(3)(ii); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-406(7) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Special
Legis. Sess.).
87.

See JULIE SAMUELS ET AL., URB. INST., COLLECTING DNA AT ARREST: POLICIES, PRACTICES,

AND IMPLICATIONS 1, 29-31 (May 2013), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publicationpdfs/412831 -collecting-DNA-at-arrest-policies-practices-and-implications.pdf
88. Indeed, it can be unclear whether expungement is ever in order. In Alabama, for instance, the
provision that expressly speaks to expungement only allows it when a conviction is reversed: "Upon the
reversal of conviction, the director shall be authorized and empowered to expunge DNA records upon
request of the person from whom the sample was taken." ALA. CODE. § 36-18-26 (2015). State law,
however, also allows DNA to be taken upon arrest for felonies and sex offenses. Id. § 36-18-25(c)(1). Yet
the authorizing provision provides without elaboration that the circuit court where the DNA sample of an
arrestee was collected can "order[] that the DNA sample should be expunged." Id. § 36-18-25(i).
89. See SAMUELS ET AL., supranote 87, at 29. According to a recent study conducted by researchers
at the Urban Institute:
[Bureau of Justice statistics] data from the 75 largest counties suggest that felony cases take a
median of just over 90 days from arrest to case disposition, and often much longer for
convictions. . . . Interviews with state laboratories suggested that the majority of arrestee
samples are processed in under 30 days, and some in just over a week. Thus, most samples
can be collected, analyzed, and uploaded to [the federal national database] before case
disposition, providing months for profiles to hit against forensic profiles before they may
become eligible for expungement.
Id. at 79 (citation omitted).
90. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(d) (West, Westlaw through Ch. I of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess).
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"[a]ny identification, warrant, probable cause to arrest, or arrest based upon
a data bank or database match is not invalidated due to a failure to expunge
or a delay in expunging records."" In Michigan," An identification, warrant,
detention, probable cause to arrest, arrest, or conviction based upon a DNA
match or DNA information is not invalidated if it is later determined
that ... [a] DNA sample ... [or] DNA identification profile was not disposed
of or there was a delay in disposing of the profile." 92 Some state laws permit
investigative use of a DNA sample secured by "mistake.""
At this time, only five states have laws that prohibit use of a DNA
sample that should have been expunged but was not:
*

*

*

*
*

Alabama: "[U]se [of a DNA sample] is authorized until ... the circuit
court where the individual was arrested, orders that the DNA should
be expunged." 94
Colorado: "A data bank or database match shall not be admitted as
evidence against a person in a criminal prosecution and shall not be
used as a basis to identify a person if the match is ... [o]btained after
the required date of destruction or expungement."'
Maryland: "A record or sample that qualifies for expungement or
destruction ... and is matched concurrent with or subsequent to the
date of qualification for expungement: (1) may not be utilized for a
determination of probable cause regardless of whether it is expunged
or destroyed timely; and (2) is not admissible in any proceeding for
any purpose." 96
Nebraska: "Any DNA sample obtained in violation of this section is
97
not admissible in any proceeding for any purpose whatsoever."
North Carolina:"Any identification, warrant, probable cause to arrest,
or arrest based upon a database match of the defendant's DNA sample
which occurs after the expiration of the statutory periods prescribed
for expunction of the defendant's DNA sample, shall be invalid and

If nothing else, these laws lend credence to the Supreme Court's lack of faith in governmental assurances.
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) ("[T]he Government proposes that law
enforcement agencies 'develop protocols to address' concerns raised by cloud computing. Probably a
good idea, but the Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols."
(quoting Reply Brief for the United States at 14, Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-212), 2014 WL 1616437
(citation omitted))); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010) ("We would not uphold an
unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.").
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(d).
92. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.176(15)(c)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.).
93. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(12)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3(o) (West 2007); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(H) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 31-13-07(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
94. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25(i) (Westlaw through Act 520 of 2015 Legis. Sess.).
95. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-23-105(6) (West 2012).
96. MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(f) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
97. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-4126(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
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inadmissible in the prosecution of the defendant for any criminal
offense." 98

'

From a best practices perspective, the foregoing survey allows for
several recommendations. Requiring a probable cause determination by a
court before DNA is collected (the policy of only eight states) is optimal for
several reasons. First, it ensures that DNA samples are taken from only those
individuals as to whom police possess the bare constitutional minimum to
search (i.e., take a buccal swab)." Second, imposing a minimum evidentiary
threshold requirement optimizes the likelihood that police will be deterred
from succumbing to the temptation recognized by Justice Tobriner.' 0 0
Finally, imposing a probable cause threshold at collection both obviates the
administrative costs associated with having to later expunge DNA samples
and limits the infusion of samples into already backlogged DNA database
systems.' 0
Expungement, however, unavoidably plays a critical role. In the event
a DNA specimen is collected and analyzed, and a profile is entered into a
database, all states agree (indeed, they must in order to have their profiles
entered into a national DNA database) that a mechanism for expungement
should be available.' 02 Only a minority of states, however, require that
expungement occur automatically as a result of government initiative,"'
which best ensures that expungement will actually occur.'" Finally, to lend
practical meaning and force to expungement,' 0 state legislatures should
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A(m) (2015).
99. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013) ("[U]nlike the search of a citizen who has
not been suspected of a wrong, a [lawfully detained individual] has a reduced expectation of privacy.").
100. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. The requirement will also guard against the
possibility seemingly left open in Davis and Hayes, that DNA, the forensic progeny of fingerprints, might
be secured on the basis of mere reasonable suspicion that an individual was involved in criminal activity.
See Maclin, supra note 12, at 394-95 (noting a possible extension of the field-based identification
exception to extraction of DNA samples).
101.

KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supranote 71, at 318-19.

102. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that the
European Court of Human Rights recently held that the U.K.'s practice of retaining arrestees' biometric
identity information violates Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms: "the permanent and indiscriminate retention of the fingerprint and DNA records
of. . .persons suspected but not convicted of offences ... constitutes a disproportionate interference with
the [individual's] right to respect for private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic
society." S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50, 1195-1202 (2009). For a discussion of
other nations' positions on the collection and retention of DNA, including Canada, which imposes the
most controls, see Liz Campbell, "Non-Conviction" DNA Databases and Criminal Justice: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 2011 J. COMMONWEALTH CRIM. L. 55.
103. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.

104. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
105. The practical importance of codifying exclusions is seen in the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision
State v. Emerson. See State v. Emerson, 981 N.E.2d 787, 793-94 (Ohio 2012). In Emerson, the defendant
was suspected of committing a rape and police obtained a lawful search warrant to secure a DNA sample
from him. Id Although the defendant was ultimately acquitted, which should have resulted in his DNA
profile being expunged from the state database, no expungement occurred because he was required to seek
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codify an exclusionary rule that precludes consideration and investigative use
of DNA that is wrongly retained.'0 At this time, only North Carolina's law
contains all these features.'0o
V. CONCLUSION

As noted at the outset, Maryland v. King's backing of warrantless
collection of DNA from arrestees heralds a new era in law enforcement. We
can expect that, just as fingerprints and photographs became "routine" in the
booking process,10 so too will DNA collection and analysis.'0 9 Indeed, in
terms of their functionality, the King majority saw the three methods as
fungible. "o In so doing, the Court has set the stage for the likely importing
of the exclusionary rule doctrine, which has long allowed police to retain and
use photos and fingerprints secured as a result of unlawful arrests."' Much
like bail money, a DNA sample will be something seen as simply a cost of
being arrested, whether rightly or wrongly.

expungement but did not do so. Id. at 794. After authorities matched his profile to DNA left at a murder
scene, the defendant challenged Ohio's retention and use of his profile. Id. at 788-89. By unanimous vote,
the supreme court rejected the claim, stating:
There is no legislative requirement that DNA profiles obtained from lawfully obtained DNA
samples be removed from [the database] on the state's initiative when the subject of the profile
is acquitted at trial, and we will not create such a requirement.. . . Since the General Assembly
opted not to provide a remedy to a party wronged by a violation of [the expungement laws],
"we are not in the position to rectify this possible legislative oversight by elevating a violation
of [these statutes] to a Fourth Amendment violation and imposing the exclusionary rule."
Id. at 794 (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Jones, 902 N.E.2d 464, 468-69 (Ohio 2009)); cf George E.
Dix, Nonconstitutional Exclusionary Rules in Criminal Procedure, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 63 (1989)
(describing the need to exclude illegally obtained evidence).
106. Such laws should also specify that both the DNA profile and the genetic DNA sample from
which it is derived are to be destroyed, a matter often unaddressed in state laws. But see, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-2511(f)(l)-(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (requiring that both the DNA
sample and profile be expunged); MONT. CODE ANN. § 650.055(10Hl 1) (West, Westlaw through 2015
Legis. Veto Sess.). On the interests implicated by government retention of samples more generally, see
Leigh M. Harlan, Note, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Mandate the Destruction
ofDNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 191-97 (2004).
107. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A (West, Westlaw through Ch. 237 of 2015 Legis. Sess.).
108. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,58 (1991) (explaining that "administrative
steps incident to arrest" include an arrestee being "booked, photographed, and fingerprinted"); Adams v.
United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Burger, J., concurring); United States v. Beckwith, 22
F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1291 (D. Utah 1998) ("The practice of routine booking photographing 'mug shots' has
become a settled administrative feature of an arrest. '. . . [O]rderly law enforcement requires certain
administrative procedures to take place after arrest and prior to arraignment. This process, which may
include finger printing, photographing and getting a proper name and address from the defendant, is
known as "booking". . . ."' (alterations in original)).
109. Cf Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop "from Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine,"
andNot EnoughFourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1843, 1862 (2004) (discussing the ever increasing
broad reach of routine traffic stops).
110. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1963-64 (2013).
111. See supra Part 111.
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DNA, however, is not only another way to verify the identity of an
arrestee, akin to fingerprints and photos; rather, it is also a uniquely powerful
forensic investigative tool."i 2 Law enforcement can already avail itself of
this power when DNA is unwittingly "shed,""' "abandoned,"" 4 secured by
consent,"' or obtained by a non-law enforcement official." 6 When arrestees
are required by law to provide a sample, the police can even threaten them
with punishment and forcible extraction of their DNA."' With all these
lawful means of collection available, not to mention the quite modest
evidentiary requirement of probable cause,"' the virtually unfettered
discretionary authority of police to arrest based on probable cause," 9 and the
ever-growing body of judicial doctrine forgiving police mistakes of fact and
law,'20 the disposition of unlawfully secured DNA assumes even greater
importance. 121
Despite the compelling reasons to distinguish DNA from fingerprints
and photographs, little reason exists to be optimistic about the judiciary
barring illegally secured DNA evidence. 12 2 Mindful of this reality, this
112. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1963.
113. See, e.g., Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 754-55 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015);
State v. Barkley, 551 S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
114. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 356-57 (Mass. 2007); State v. Athan, 158
P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007) (en banc); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The
FourthAmendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REv. 857, 865 (2006) ("With abandoned DNA,
existing Fourth Amendment law appears not to apply at all.").
115. See, e.g., Varrialev. State, 119 A.3d 824,833-35 (Md. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that consensually
provided DNA can be retained by the state and used to connect donor to unrelated offense investigated
many years later).
116. People v. Casillas, No. 12CA0703, 2015 WL 795765, at *1 (Colo. App. Feb. 26, 2015).
117. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 298.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. I of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g(j) (West 2009).
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Article has urged state political actors to take action. Whether they will
embrace needed reforms like those suggested here, including imposing a
threshold requirement of probable cause, automatic expungement, and
statutory exclusion, is of course open to question. In North Carolina,
however, and to a lesser degree elsewhere, such limits are in place, affording
a basis for optimism.' 2 3 Hopefully, the discussion here helps advance that
worthwhile goal.

123.

See supranote 98 and accompanying text.

